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                    【金融系學術講座】講座題目:Sword of Damocles: Job Security and Earnings Management
                    日期: 2019-04-19

                    嘉賓介紹


                    ? ? 李荻教授畢業于美國密歇根大學(安娜堡)羅斯商學院,獲得工商管理(金融專業)博士。他于2017年加入北京大學匯豐商學院,任金融學助教授yabo亚博app。此前,他曾供職于美國佐治亞州立大學,任羅賓森商學院金融系助理教授yabo亚博app。李荻教授的研究領域包括公司財務、公司治理、兼并收購yabo亚博app、結構性估算yabo亚博app,曾在The Journal of Financial Economics,Management Scienceyabo亚博app,Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysisyabo亚博app,China Economic Quarterly等著名期刊上發表論文,曾入選沃頓研究數據中心“卓越學者計劃”(WRDS Advanced Research Scholar Program),并獲得最佳論文獎yabo亚博appyabo亚博app。



                    講座摘要


                    ? ? Job security concerns may have a disciplinary or opportunistic effect on CEOs’ behavior. We study these two effects in the setting of earnings management. We find that an increase in CEO dismissal hazard is associated with smaller income-inflating accruals and less real earnings management, which is consistent with the disciplinary effect. In contrast, the opportunistic effect exists but only when dismissal risk is extremely high. Overall, our evidence supports the notion that forced turnover is an effective corporate governance measure that deters CEOs from engaging in misbehaviors.


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